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NOTES AND COMMENTS
REJECTION OF UNEXPIRED OIL AND GAS
LEASES IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS:
IN RE J.IL LAND & CATTLE CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
In oil and gas transactions, various hazards can cut short an oil
and gas lease.' In an unsteady economy, the bankruptcy 2 of a lessor is
1. An oil and gas lease is an instrument by which a lessor grants to a lessee "the exclusive
right to enter the described premises to explore. . . drill ...and remove oil and gas . . . in
consideration for... rents and royalties ... . Myers, Interests in Oil and Gas Creation and
Transfer, 54 MICH. ST. B.J. 96, 96 (1975) (citations omitted). A typical lease has a primary term
and a provision for the continuation of the lease beyond the primary term by the commencement
of drilling operations and production. Id.
2. Upon the payment of a fee as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (1982), a voluntary bank-
ruptcy is commenced by the filing of a bankruptcy petition under the chapter selected. 11 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1982). Seegenerally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 301.01 (15th ed. 1983) (discusses com-
mencement of voluntary bankruptcy proceedings); D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 144.46 (1980) (discusses commencement of a voluntary case); P. MURPHY, CREDITOR'S
RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 3.02 (1982) (discusses voluntary bankruptcy proceedings).
The chapter under which a debtor files the petition governs the relief received. A chapter 7
bankruptcy initiates liquidation and distribution of the debtor's assets. A chapter 11 bankruptcy
serves to reorganize and rehabilitate an individual, partnership, or corporate debtor so his debts
can be paid on a pro rata basis within a ten year period. A chapter 13 bankruptcy allows an
individual, with a certain kind and amount of debt and a regular income, to reorganize and make
payments to his creditors. In a chapter 11 reorganization proceeding the creditors are generally
paid out of the debtor's future earnings, not out of the property the debtor owns at the time the
petition was filed. See D. EPSTEIN, supra, at 134-36; Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 467, 494 (1963) (theory behind reorganiza-
tion is that creditor, by making sacrifice now, will receive more later). This Note will focus only
upon reorganization proceedings under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and on reorganization
proceedings in general under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Bankruptcy Act), Act of July 1, 1898,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (amended 1938); Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 354, 84 Stat. 468 (repealed
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 598, 92 Stat. 2549). See generally Shanker, The
Treatment of Executory Contracts and Leases in Bankruptcy Chapter X and XI Proceedings, 18
PRAc. LAW. 15, 16 (1972) (describes reorganization chapters under Bankruptcy Act). A "person"
may file a chapter 11 voluntary bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(d), 301 (1982). "Per-
son" is defined in id § 101(30) to include an individual, partnership or corporation. See also 2
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 109.04, at 109-18 (15th ed. 1983) (discusses who may be a debtor
under chapter 11). Two events occur upon the filing of a petition under chapter 11: First, an
estate is created for the benefit of the creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982). See 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY % 541.04, at 541-21 (15th ed. 1983). Second, an automatic stay operates to stop
actions against the debtor by all entities with claims against the debtor. I 1 U.S.C. §§ 301, 362(a)
(1982).
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one potential hazard confronting a nondebtor-lessee. Upon a lessor's
bankruptcy, the trustee3 may reject4 or assume5 the debtor-lessor's ex-
ecutory contracts or unexpired leases under section 365(a) 6 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978' (Bankruptcy Code or Code). The ra-
3. A trustee is a "representative of the estate," and is authorized to "operate the debtor's
business." I 1 U.S.C. §§ 323, 1108 (1982). Certain basic standards must be met for one to serve as
a trustee. Id §§ 321, 322 (person must be competent, never have served as examiner in current
case, and be bonded with court to qualify as trustee). The duties of a trustee are enumerated in id
§ 1106 and consist essentially of the operation of the debtor's business and the formulation of a
chapter I1 plan. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 141. In a chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor
exercises the trustee powers and is called a "debtor in possession." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107
(1982). See Bienenstock, The Bankruptcy Code and Landlords and Tenants, 3 LEGAL NOTES &
ViawPoiNTs Q. 9, 11-12 (1982) (discusses debtor in possession as trustee). On the filing of a chap-
ter 11 petition, the debtor in possession is automatically authorized to operate the business pursu-
ant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108 (1982). As to the power of a debtor in possession as trustee to
reject under id § 365(a), see Bistrian v. Easthampton Sand & Gravel Co. (In re Easthampton
Sand & Gravel Co.), 25 Bankr. 193, 198 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (section 365(a) as applied in
conjunction with § 1107 affords debtor in possession the discretionary right to assume or reject); In
re California Steel Co., 24 Bankr. 185, 186 & n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982) (debtor in possession
exercises § 365(a) right pursuant to § 1107 which grants debtor in possession the rights of a
trustee). At any time after the commencement of the case, but before the confirmation of the plan,
a trustee can be appointed upon request of a "party in interest." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
However, the "party in interest" must prove one of the grounds listed in id § 1104(a)(1)(2) to have
the debtor in possession replaced by a disinterested third party trustee. See generally 5 BANKR.
SERV. (L. ED.) § 41:29-31, at 21-22 (1979); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 1104.01[7], at 1104-15 to
24 (15th ed. 1983) (analysis of§ 1104(a)); D. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 283-84 (debtor in possession
continues to operate business unless request is made for appointment of a trustee).
4. The trustee's power to reject or renounce an executory contract or unexpired lease is
subject to approval by the court. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). (Other limitations on the trustee's
power to reject, beyond the scope of this paper, are set forth in § 365). See generally Bienenstock,
supra note 3, at 33 (discusses debtor-lessor's power to reject); Creedon & Zinman, Landlords
Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAW. 1391 (1971) (discusses rejection powers under the
Bankruptcy Act); Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64
MINN. L. REv. 341, 377-80 (1980) (discusses trustees rejection powers under Bankruptcy Code);
Shanker, supra note 2 (discusses rejection powers under the Bankruptcy Act); Silverstein, supra
note 2 (discusses rejection by trustees under Bankruptcy Act).
5. The trustee's decision to retain or assume an executory contract or unexpired lease which
the debtor made prior to bankruptcy is governed by § 365(a), and is "subject to court approval."
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). See generaly P. MURPHY, supra note 2, § 9.0, at 9 (discusses effect of
rejection); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 7.10[3], at 7-39 (discusses
requirements for assumption); Comment, Chapter X TrusteeAdoption ofExecutory Contracts: The
Bankruptcy Act Speaks Through Its Silence, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 937 (1967) (discusses adoption of
executory contracts); Fogel, supra note 4, at 346-60 (same).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) allows the trustee to reject executory contracts and unexpired
leases. Section 365(a) provides: "The trustee, subject to court approval, may assume or reject an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id See generally A. NAMDAR, CONTRACTS
IN BANKRUPTCY (1977) (discusses history and theory underlying executory contracts in bank-
ruptcy proceedings); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03, at 365-13 to -16 (15th ed. 1983) (dis-
cusses trustee's power to assume or reject under § 365(a)); Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439 (1973) (thorough discussion of executory contracts)
(hereinafter cited as Countryman I); Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 11, 58
MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974) (same) (hereinafter cited as Countryman II).
7. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code or Code), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C. (Supp. 111978, Supp. III 1979, Supp.
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tionale underlying this power is twofold: First, to insulate the trustee
from executory contracts and unexpired leases which do not enhance
the debtor's estate; and second, to enable the trustee to take advantage
of executory contracts and unexpired leases which benefit the estate
and effectuate the purposes of a reorganization proceeding under chap-
ter eleven of the Bankruptcy Code, namely, the rehabilitation and con-
tinued operation of the debtor.' In a reorganization under chapter
eleven, the trustee's power to reject "is especially important . . . [be-
cause] it is used to relieve the debtor in possession of unperformed obli-
gations that would otherwise hamper the . . . opportunity to make a
fresh start."9
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma recently held in In re JH. Land & Cattle Co. l" that an
unexpired oil and gas lease is within the meaning of section 365(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code.'I The court concluded that the trustee may reject
one unexpired oil and gas lease in favor of another "preferable oil and
gas lease."' 2 The court also held that a Kansas oil and gas lease is
personal property, 13 and therefore, the nondebtor-lessee's sole remedy
for rejection of the unexpired lease is a claim for damages. 14
IV 1980, Supp. V 1981 & 1982)). The Bankruptcy Code was enacted on November 6, 1978, but
was not effective until October 1, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-498,
§ 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682. Cases filed before October 1, 1979 are decided under the Bankruptcy Act.
Cases filed on or after October 1, 1979 are governed by the Bankruptcy Code. See Central Trust
Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enter., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 354 (1982).
8. See Vilas & Sommer, Inc. v. Mahony (In re Steelship Corp.), 576 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.
1978). The court in Steelshio stated:
One purpose of. . . [the Bankruptcy Act's power of rejection] is to allow the trustee an
opportunity to determine which of the bankrupt's contracts are beneficial to the estate
and on that basis make an election whether to assume or. . . reject. . . . A parallel
purpose is to clarify the effect of an assumption of liabilities by the trustee. It is well
settled that the trustee cannot accept the benefits. . . without assuming. . . [the] bur-
dens as well.
id at 132 (citations omitted).
9. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 5, 17.10, at 7-37. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234 (1934), the Court stated:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor from
the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obli-
gations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes." [The debtor should
be provided with]. . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for the future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Id at 244 (citations omitted).
10. 8 Bankr. 237 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (Kline, J.).
11. Id at 239.
12. Id
13. See infra notes 168-95 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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This Note addresses the effect of In re JH. Land & Cattle Co. 15 on
Oklahoma oil and gas lessees. It also explores the circumstances by
which a trustee's decision to reject a nondebtor-lessee's oil and gas
lease might be approved by a court, examines the nature of an oil and
gas lease in Oklahoma, and suggests various options attorneys may
consider in protecting the rights of a nondebtor oil and gas lessee. 6
II. DECISION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
Prior to the debtor's bankruptcy petition being filed in Oklahoma,
two cases were commenced against J.H. Land & Cattle Company
which resulted in the Kansas District Court appointing two receivers.17
Subsequently, orders were entered specifically authorizing the two re-
ceivers to negotiate oil and gas leases for the benefit of the receiver-
ships." The lessee entered into several oil and gas leases with each
state receiver.' 9 In exchange, the lessee gave each receiver a one-eighth
royalty interest and promised to drill six wells on or before August 19,
1981.20 In addition, the lessee paid approximately $25,335.00 as lease
bonus for all the leases.21 Approximately one month after the leases
were transacted but before any actual drilling activity, the lessor, J.H.
Land & Cattle Company, fied a bankruptcy petition under chapter
eleven of the Code.22
The trustee 3 as debtor-lessor made application and notice of mo-
15. 8 Bankr. 237 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
16. In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co. is the only reported case that interprets the rejection of a
lessee's unexpired oil and gas lease under 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982). One other case, decided under
the Bankruptcy Act, discusses the rejection of an oil and gas lease in the context of a reorganiza-
tion proceeding. See Hill v. Larcon Co., 4 OIL & GAS REp. 1701 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (trustee
rejected the oil and gas lease by failure to take affirmative action within 60 days under § 110(b) of
title 11 of the Bankruptcy Act).
17. Letterbrief for Lessee at 2, 8 Bankr. at 238. Mr. Rogers was appointed as a receiver for
J.H. Land & Cattle Company on July 18, 1980. Subsequently, on August 29, 1980, Mr. Perkins
was appointed as a receiver for the same.
18. Id The Kansas District Court orders were final and nonappealable prior to the date J.H.
Land & Cattle Company, through its president, filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
19. In September, 1980, the lessee, Mr. Masek, negotiated five oil and gas leases covering
approximately 760 acres with the first receiver, Mr. Rogers. The lessee negotiated six oil and gas
leases in October 1980 with Mr. Perkins, the second receiver. These leases covered approximately
1,250 acres. Id
20. Id at 3, 8 Bankr. at 238.
21. The lessee, Mr. Masek, also paid approximately $5,278.13 as a lease broker fee. Id A
bonus is the "cash amount paid to a lessor as consideration for the execution of an oil and gas
lease." See Meyers, supra note 1, at 97.
22. J.H. Land & Cattle Company, the debtor-lessor, filed bankruptcy on November 4, 1980.
Letterbrief at 2, 8 Bankr. at 238. The lessee, prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, "expended time,
effort and expense in preparing to develop the properties leases." Id at 3, 8 Bankr. at 238.
23. The president of J.H. Land & Cattle Company fied the bankruptcy petition and subse-
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss1/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:68
tion in seeking2 4 to reject the unexpired oil and gas leases entered into
by the state receivers." Rejection of the existing leases was sought be-
cause a new, more "preferable" oil and gas lease was available to the
debtor's estate.2 6 After notice and a full evidentiary hearing the court
stated that the unexpired oil and gas leases were within the confines of
section 365(a)27 and applied the business judgment test,28 concluding
that the debtor-lessor as trustee could reject the existing leases in favor
quently became the debtor in possession as trustee. See supra note 3 for discussion of power of a
debtor in possession, as trustee, to reject under 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
24. Bankruptcy Judge Ralph Mabey explained the procedure for rejection of an executory
contract or unexpired lease in Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 4 COLLIER
BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1431 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981):
Issues surrounding the rejection of executory contracts are usually treated as contested
matters under Rule 914, Fed. R. Bankr. P., rather than as adversary proceedings under
Rule 701, Fed. R. Bankr. P.: "Where a debtor in possession seeks leave to reject an
executory contract. . . such proceeding should be brought on by application and notice
of motion. This is so because the relief contemplated. . . is not one of those. ..touch-
ing Adversary Proceedings and, therefore, must under Rule 914 be considered to be a
contested matter not otherwise governed by the rules with the result that relief is to be
requested by motion and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing is to be afforded
the party against whom relief is sought. . . . The hearing is an evidentiary hearing.
Id at 1435 n.4 (citing 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I1-53.04[l], at 11-53-10 to -13 (14th ed.
1976)); see also 8 BANKR. SERV. (L. ED.) §§ 71:136, 71:138 (1979) (forms for petition to reject and
order to reject an executory contract or unexpired lease). The rules for procedure relating to
rejection can be found in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED BANK-
RUPTcY RULES AND OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORMS 165 (1982) (Hereinafter cited as PROPOSED
RULES) (these rules became effective August 1, 1983).
25. 8 Bankr. at 239. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982) provides that rejection of an unexpired lease
or executory contract "constitutes a breach of such contract or lease." Section 365(g)(1) allows the
breach caused by the rejection to be treated as if it had occurred immediately before the date of
the filing of the petition. Therefore, the lessee's claim for damages is treated in the same manner
as an unsecured prepetition claim. Id § 502(g).
26. The debtor-lessor's original lease obligated the lessee to drill six wells, and additional
wells as commercially feasible in exchange for the grant of a one-eighth royalty interest and a
bonus of approximately $25,335.00. 8 Bankr. at 238. By contrast, American Drilling Inc. offered
the debtor-lessor considerably more for the leases. American Drilling offered the debtor-lessor
three wells drilled "immediately", twenty-two wells as commercially feasible, $4,000 a month bo-
nus payable for up to six months, and a three-sixteenth royalty interest. Id
27. 8 Bankr. at 239 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982)). The court did not specifically
state that an expired oil and gas lease falls within the unexpired lease category of executory con-
tracts under id. § 365(a). However, it can be inferred that the court classified the unexpired oil
and gas lease as a lease under id. § 365(a) because the issue of whether the lease was a lease of real
or personal property under id. § 365(h) was reached. It should be noted that all kinds of
unexpired leases, real or personal, can be rejected by a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code. See
i d § 365(a); Cook, Judicial Standardsfor Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Code
Reorganization Cases, 4 ANN SURV. AM. L. 689 (1980). Professor Cook states: "The provisions of
section 365 are not limited to real property leases, thereby permitting rejection of any kind of a
lease, including leases of personal property and equipment." Id at 690; see, e.g., Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. (In re Elliott Leases Cars, Inc.), 20 Bankr. 893,
896 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982) (executory contract under Code includes automobile lease or personal
property lease).
28. See infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
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of the prefered leases.29 Discussing the issue of "court approval" as
required by section 365(a), the court stated:
For court approval the Code may well only require the court
to find that . . . the debtor's (trustees) business judgment as
exercised is not clearly erroneous. . . . However, if the pre-
Code rule still prevails which seems to require the court as
distinguished from . . [the] trustee to apply the "business
judgment" test . . . the court . . . is satisfied that [the origi-
nal] leases should be rejected. 30
Furthermore, the court held that because oil and gas leases in Kansas
are personal property,31 the nondebtor-lessee could not take advantage
of section 365(h)(1) to stop the trustee from rejecting the unexpired
leases.3 2
11. REJECTION OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED
LEASES
The law surrounding the rejection of executory contracts and
unexpired leases is not uniform. 3 Adding to this nonuniformity is the
29. 8 Bankr. at 239.
30. Id
31. Id Although the case was decided by the Oklahoma Bankruptcy Court, the applicable
law was Kansas law as the situs of the property at issue was in Kansas. Under Kansas law, rights
created by oil and gas leases "constitute intangible personal property except when that classifica-
tion is changed for a specific purpose by statute." Ingram v. Ingram, 214 Kan. 415, -, 521 P.2d
254, 257 (1974) (emphasis deleted). Similarly, oil and gas lease rights in Oklahoma are personal in
nature. See generall, 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.02, at 365-12 & n.5 (15th ed. 1983) (law
of situs of property governs); W. THORTON, I THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 51, at 153 (4th ed.
1925) (the rights of the parties must be determined by the law of the state where the leased prem-
ises lie, although it be executed in another state where lessor or lessee reside); Silverstein, supra
note 2, at 488 (bankruptcy court applies property law of the state where leased premises are
located).
32. 8 Bankr. at 239. Section 365(h)(1) provides:
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of realproperty of the debtor under which the
debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such lease may treat the lease as terminated by such
rejection, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession for the balance of the term of
such lease and any renewal or extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee
under applicable non-bankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 349, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6305-06; 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 365.09, at 365-42 (15th ed. 1983) (discussing lessee remaining in possession pursuant to
§ 365(h)(1)). The predecessor to § 365(h)(1) was § 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. The purpose
behind both of these sections is to ensure that the nondebtor-lessee is not deprived of his estate in
real property in "the term for which he bargained." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra at 349, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6305-06.
33. See Shanker, supra note 2, at 16-17 which states:
Going beyond ... [the] statutory provisions, we are in a largely unchartered area of law
.... In fact, there is only one section... [section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, which
is the predecessor of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code] that really tells us anything on how
6
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unique problem of a lessor in reorganization proceedings, as illustrated
by In re JIH Land & Cattle Co. 34 Historically lessors seldom file bank-
ruptcy, accordingly, case law concerning their rejection of executory
contracts and unexpired leases is scarce.35 Compounding the inconsis-
tent and sparse statutory and judicial guidance is the fact that "the
power of rejection has never. . . been reexamined by the courts...
[and courts] have merely elaborated on the received rules."36
The rationale underlying the power of rejection is to aid in the
augmentation of the estate37 and is an attempt "to strike a balance be-
tween two. . . competing considerations: the right of a nondebtor to
get the performance for which he bargained; and the right of the gen-
eral creditors to get the benefit. . . of the debtor's bargain. ' 38 Gener-
ally, "[tihe power of rejection is an anomaly to contract or property law
. . . . The power of rejection is a valuable weapon. . . in the armory
of the trustee in protecting the rights of creditors. . . . Inevitably...
[the] two attitudes are at war with one another."39 The effects of rejec-
tion cannot be tempered by permitting rejection of only a part of the
executory contract or unexpired lease. It is well established that rejec-
tion must be "in its entirety or not at all."40
to deal with executory contracts in bankruptcy-and, unfortunately, that. . . does not
tell us very much.
Furthermore, ._. few decisions [deal] with the problems. . . and many. . . (cases]
were decided under the old equity receiverships rather than under the Bankruptcy Act
[or the Bankruptcy Code]. . . . This then is. . . the legal wilderness upon which small
fortunes may depend when an executory contract is up for consideration in. . . [reor-
ganization] proceeding[s].
Id; see also P. MURPHY, supra note 2, § 9.03, at 9-4 (case law uncertainty will probably continue
in light of recent nonuniform decisions).
34. 8 Bankr. 237; see also In re Mykleburst, 26 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1983) (debtor-
lessor sought to reject unexpired lease); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1979) (same); Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1942);
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York R.R., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (same).
35. See H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE To THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
149 (1979) (debtor-lessor who seeks disaffirmance faces unique situation); Cook, supra note 27, at
689 (concise and thorough analysis of debtor's rejection under I I U.S.C. § 365 (1982)).
36. Silverstein, supra note 2, at 472, 467-68 & n.5 (all the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
are declaratory of preexisting case law).
37. Krasnowiecki, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Reform Act on Real Estate Development
andFinancing, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 363, 382 (1979) (purpose of power to reject is to augment the
debtors estate).
38. Fogel, supra note 4, at 388.
39. Silverstein, supra note 2, at 468 (citation omitted); see also Shanker, supra note 2, at 15
(absent bankruptcy proceedings, law required people to perform their contracts or required them
to pay damages).
40. In re Silver, 7 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1107, 1110 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1983) (cita-
tion omitted); see, e.g., In re California Steel Co., 24 Bankr. 185, 188 (Bankr. N.D. I!1. 1982) (an
executory contract must be rejected in its entirety); Cottman Transmissions, Inc. v. Holland
[Vol. 19:68
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Upon postpetition rejection by the trustee, a debtor-lessor is freed
from prior valid but unperformed prepetition obligations. The rejec-
tion does not extinguish the estate's liability for the obligations, but
only "alter[s] the type of obligation for which the estate is liable." 4 1
The rejection of the executory contract or unexpired lease is statutorily
construed as a prepetition breach giving rise to a claim for damages.42
Once rejected, the nondebtor-lessee's claim is relegated to an unsecured
status43 for which the debtor's estate will be responsible on a percent-
age distribution scheme.'
The basis for rejection is the judicially created doctrine of aban-
donment of valueless assets.45 This doctrine simply represents the prin-
ciple that receivers or liquidators "are not bound to accept property
which, in their judgment, is of an onerous and unprofitable nature, and
would burden instead of [benefit] the estate. 46 The abandonment doc-
trine first evolved into a nonstatutory judicial doctrine governing eq-
uity receiverships, 47 and then into the bankruptcy statutes governing
Enter., Inc. (In re Holland Enter., Inc.), 25 Bankr. 301, 303 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1982) (same); In re
Rovine Corp., 6 Bankr. 661, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (same).
41. Leonard v. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank (In re Middleton), 3 Bankr. 610, 613 (Bankr. E.D.
Penn. 1980); see also Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1979)
(rejection increases value of general unsecured creditor's rights but simultaneously generates
claims by lessee against the estate for rejected lease); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03, at 365-
14 (15th ed. 1983) (rejection is important because of consequences to estate).
42. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g) (1982). See Solon Automated Servs., Inc. v. Georgetown
of Kettering, Ltd. (In re Solon Automated Servs., Inc.), 22 Bankr. 312, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982) (post petition rejection is construed as prepetition breach).
43. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(a), (b), (g) (1982); see In re International Coins & Currency,
Inc., 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 309, 313 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (if lease is rejected, claim
against estate is reduced to unsecured status).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982); see Shanker, supra note 2, at 15-16 (debtor's ability to reject
facilitates the debtor's rehabilitation by allowing percentage rate of distribution, but also has effect
of shattering economic expectations of party whose contract was rejected).
45. See A. Namdar, supra note 6 (discusses history and theory underlying executory con-
tracts in bankruptcy proceedings); Cook, supra note 27, at 692; Countryman I, supra note 6, at
440-50 (discusses how power to reject grew out of power to abandon); Fogel, supra note 4, at 343
& n.4 (trustee's power to reject stems from power to abandon); Silverstein, supra note 2, at 468-72
(historical background of rejection discussed). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.01
[1], at 365-6 (15th ed. 1983) (concept of rejection had its roots in principle that trustee could
abandon burdensome property); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 5 7.10[2], at 7-39
(power to reject grew out of power to abandon burdensome property).
46. Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 515-16 (1896) (assignee and receivers can abandon
worthless assets); see also Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 F. 772, 773 (2d Cir. 1914)
(receiver has right to abandon nonbeneficial asset); American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288,
295 (1884) (it is a recognized rule that assignee "is not bound to accept property of onerous or
unprofitable character"); Bourdillon v. Dalton, 170 Eng. Rep. 340 (1794) (assignee may abandon
an interest that produces nothing for the estate).
47. See, e.g., Quincy, Mo. & Pac. R.R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82 (1892); American Brake
Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York R.R., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); Coy v. Title Guarantee &
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reorganization proceedings,48 both of which allowed the rejection of
onerous or unprofitable executory contracts or unexpired leases. In an-
alyzing whether an executory contract in the form of an unexpired
lease should be rejected in a reorganization bankruptcy, four levels of
analysis are addressed: First, does the unexpired lease fit within the
statutory language of section 365(a)? Second, what standard should be
applied in the trustee's decision to reject? Third, in reviewing the
trustee's decision to reject what standard should the bankruptcy court
apply? Fourth, what are the consequences of rejection of the unexpired
lease, and how should the equities be balanced as between the
nondebtor-lessee, and the general creditors of the estate?
It should be noted that a rejection can be approved or disapproved
by the bankruptcy court in two levels of the analysis. In the second
level of its analysis, the bankruptcy court may disapprove a trustee's
attempted rejection of an unexpired lease when it feels the trustee has
not applied the correct standard in his decision to reject. Also, even if
the trustee has applied the correct standard in level two, the court, in its
final analysis, reserves authority to overturn the trustee's rejection
when it is deemed necessary to balance the equities between the parties.
For example, although not recorded in the opinion of In re JH. Land&
Cattle Co.,4 Judge Kline approved the trustee's rejection of the
unexpired leases because, as of the bankruptcy petition date, the
nondebtor-lessee had not commenced the physical operations for de-
velopment of the leases.50 Judge Kline stated that if the facts had been
different, i.e., had there been actual production of oil and gas, "an en-
tirely different issue would be presented to the court."'" Judge Kline
implied that equitable considerations may have warranted a different
result had the nondebtor-lessee begun actual production of oil and
Trust Co., 198 F. 275 (D. Ore. 1912); see also Silverstein, supra note 2, at 471 & n.18 (general law
regarding rejection delineated and developed in equity receivership cases in federal courts).
48. See Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1979) (power
to reject under § 70(b) of Bankruptcy Act derived from doctrine of abandonment of burdensome
assets); In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 20 Bankr. 497, 499 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (section 365 replaces
§ 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.01[2], at 365-9 & n.10 (15th ed.
1983) (Bankruptcy Act codified preexisting case law); B. WEINTRAUB & N. RESNICK, supra note 5,
7.10, at 7-36 & n.142 (Bankruptcy Code § 365 follows Bankruptcy Act § 70(b) in allowing trustee
to reject).
49. 8 Bankr. 237.
50. Telephone interview with the Honorable David Kline, Bankruptcy Judge for the Western
District of Oklahoma (January 24, 1983).
51. Id It should be noted that if the nondebtor-lessee had started actual production of oil
and gas, the debtor in possession as trustee would probably not have wanted to reject the
unexpired oil and gas lease as it would be contributing to the value of the estate.
[Vol. 19:68
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gas.52
A. Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
Neither bankruptcy statutes53 nor their legislative histories54 have
explicitly defined executory contracts, 55 other than to say that the term
"generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to
some extent on both sides,' 56 a common example of which is an
unexpired lease. 7 Consequently, prior case law is the instrument by
which the meaning of "executory contracts" is determined.5 8 The clas-
sification of each individual transaction is, as Professor Countryman
describes, somewhat similar to "one method of sculpting an ele-
52. Id
53. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Act of July 1, 1898 ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (amended 1938); Act
of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 354, 84 Stat. 468 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682); 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
54. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 32, at 347-50, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6303-06; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-60, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5844-46; see also Turner, Bankruptcy and Executory Contracts, 41 TITLE NEWS 114
(1962).
55. Black's defines an executory contract as "[a] contract that has not yet been fully com-
pleted or performed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 512 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted); see also
Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. American Magnesium Co. (In re American Magnesium Co.), 488 F.2d
147, 152 (5th Cir. 1974) ("An executory contract is one in which a party binds himself to do or not
do a particular thing, whereas an executed contract is one in which the object of the agreement is
already performed.") (citations omitted); 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.43[2], at 522 (14th ed.
1978) (as long as any part of contract remains unperformed, contract is executory).
56. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 32, at 347, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6303;
cf. Cottman Transmissions, Inc. v. Holland Enter., Inc. (In re Holland Enter., Inc.), 25 Bankr. 301,
302-03 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1982) (executory contract is one in which performance remains due for
both parties); Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 104, 117
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same). One authority points out:
[B]y treating as executory only those contracts in the .. reorganization context where
some performance is still due from both the debtor and the nondebtor party, the courts
have applied a commonsense view because if the trustee treated as executory a contract
that had been fully completed by the debtor, rejection would be meaningless because the
other contracting party would have no damages ....
H. MILLER & M. COOK, supra note 35, at 144. "If the other party to the contract had fully per-
formed its obligation but the debtor had not, rejection would merely give the nondebtor. . . a
claim that it has already." Id; see also Countryman I, supra note 6, at 458 (contract fully per-
formed by debtor is not executory).
57. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.02, at 365-12 to -13 (15th ed. 1983) (neither Code
nor Act define executory contract other than by referring to unexpired leases); 4A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 70.44, at 548 & n.18a (14th ed. 1978) ("[ulnexpired lease is but a form of executory
contract" and rules relating to leases follow much the same pattern as those relating to executory
contracts); Countryman I, supra note 6, at 450 ("What is an executory contract, other than an
unexpired lease. . .?"); Silverstein, supra note 2, at 479 (history shows unexpired lease is arche-
type of rejectable contract); cf Weil v. Lansburgh (In re Garfinkle), 577 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir.
1983) (whether debtor is lessor or lessee, the Act permits rejection of unexpired lease but different
equitable principles apply where debtor is lessor rather than lessee).
58. See Cook, supra note 27, at 689-90 (existing case law helps determine executory contract
status as legislative history and Code do not define it).
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phant.' ' 59 Cases interpreting an executory contract rely on the threshold
inquiry set forth by Professor Countryman: Is this "a contract under
which the obligations of the [debtor] and the other party to the contract
are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete perform-
ance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of
the other?"6 In line with the Bankruptcy Commission's intentional
omission of a definition,6' most courts agree that executory contracts
should be defined in light of the policy underlying the power of rejec-
tion in conjunction with the goals of the reorganization trustee, in order
that equity may be served.62 As stated by one court, the consequences
of rejection of a contract or unexpired lease are measured "in terms of
benefit to the estate and the protection of creditors, [it is] not the form
of [the] contract. . which controls., 6 1 "[I]n the final analysis, execu-
59. Countryman I, supra note 6, at 460 n.85 (to sculpt an elephant, "[olbtain a large piece of
stone. Take hammer and chisel and knock off everything that doesn't look like an elephant.").
60. Id; see, e.g., In re Silver, 7 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1107, 1109 (Bankr. E.D.
Penn. 1983) (Countryman definition accepted by weight of authority); In re California Steel Co.,
24 Bankr. 185, 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982) (crucial factor in executory contract is existence of
unperformed obligations at time of bankruptcy petition); In re Gladding Corp., 22 Bankr. 632, 634
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (Countryman definition is briefly stated as any contract which is materi-
ally breachable by both sides) (emphasis in original).
61. The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws suggested an executory contract should not be
defined as "[i]ts general meaning is well understood, any succinct statutory language risks an
unintended omission or inclusion." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, pt. 1, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 198-99; see also In re Glad-
ding Corp., 22 Bankr. 632, 634 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (intentional omission so court can be
flexible in construction of Bankruptcy Act); H. MILLER & M. COOK, supra note 35, at 141.
62. See, e.g, Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978). The court in Jolly stated:
The key ... to deciphering the meaning of the executory contract rejection provisions, is
to work backward, proceeding from an examination of the purposes rejection is expected
to accomplish. If those objectives have already been accomplished.. . through rejec-
tion, then the contract is not executory ...
Id at 351. Professor Countryman states that a trustee's power to reject "is an option to be exer-
cised when it will benefit the estate. . . . [I]t should not extend to situations where the only effect
of its exercise would be to prejudice other creditors of the estate." Countryman 1, supra note 6, at
450-51; see also Creedon & Zinman, supra note 4, at 1401 ("Rarely can a legal question. . . in
vacuo be answered with confidence. . . . In order to determine... whether any particular con-
tract ... 'is executory . . . we must know why the question is asked and what would be the
consequences of the answer.") (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); In re Gladding Corp., 22
Bankr. 632, 635 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (court should not be bound by static definition of execu-
tory contract); In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 54-57 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (thorough analysis of
development of Countryman definition with conclusion that "the exceptions virtually swallow the
Countryman rule").
63. In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 57 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (Mabey, J.) (discusses judicial ero-
sion of Countryman's definition of executory contracts). Judge Mabey remarks:
There are many examples of the use of "policy," rather than a rule like the Countryman
test, in determining what is an "executory contract"....
This approach may be criticized for being result oriented. . . . [Hlowever ...
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tory contracts are not measured by a mutuality of commitment but by
the nature of the parties and the goals of reorganization." ' For exam-
ple, in King v. Baer65 the court held a contract for the purchase of an
interest in an oil and gas permit to be executory, despite the fact that
the property interest had vested under the contract prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy. The court upheld the executory nature of the contract
based upon the "complex obligations" of each party, the "highly specu-
lative probability of success and the additional expenditure of large
sums of money which made the continued performance of the contract
. . . 'risky.' ,66 Other courts have found that an executory contract ex-
ists where "[b]oth parties [have] ongoing commitments, ' 67 but have
limited this definition in situations where "[a] party. . . has not fully
performed the terms of a written contract, [or] when it admits that it
will never be able to perform those terms. 68 According to one court:
"Although 'the unexpired lease is the archetype of the rejectable con-
tract' . . its treatment has varied depending on the policies at
stake. 69
Thus far, two courts have considered the classification of an
unexpired oil and gas lease in a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding.
First, by dictum, in Hill v. Larcon7° an unexpired oil and gas lease was
deemed rejected under section 70(b), the Bankruptcy Act's predecessor
to section 365, 7 1 as an unexpired lease. Second, an unexpired oil and
gas lease was deemed rejected as an unexpired72 lease under section
[being result oriented] is endemic to the policymaking which has determined what is an
executory contract. . . . Indeed, the Countryman test, which is predicated on the policy
of benefit to the estate, is result oriented.
Id at 57-58 & n.6.
64. Id at 56.
65. 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
66. Id at 557 (citing Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 683, 699 (10th Cir. 1960)).
67. E.g., Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. American Magnesium Co. (In re American Magnesium
Co.), 488 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1974).
68. In re Biron, Inc., 23 Bankr. 241, 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (purchase agreement for
sale of percentage of oil and gas leasehold interests was not executory contract because debtor
knew he would not be able to acquire the required percentage).
69. In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 57 & n.6 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
70. 4 OIL & GAS REP. 1701, 1707 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
71. Section 70(b) of the Act was replaced by 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (Supp. IV 1963), which was
replaced by 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982) will not apply to a lease which was not in existence at the time the
bankruptcy petition was filed; see, e.g., Allied Technology, Inc. v. Brunemann & Sons, Inc. (In re
Allied Technology, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 484, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (threshold question is
whether lease existed at time petition filed); In re Horace Jones, Inc., 8 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.
(MB) 215, 218 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976) (sublease was no longer executory because debtor no
longer had duty to perform under lease).
1983]
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365 of the Code by the court in In re -JH. Land & Cattle Co. " In
analyzing whether an unexpired oil and gas lease should be classified
as an executory contract, it is important to note the corresponding
rights and duties of oil and gas lessors and lessees in conjunction with
the fundamental goals and policies underlying the rejection power in
the context of reorganizations.
An oil and gas lease is "both a conveyance of mineral rights...
and a contract between the lessor and lessee relating to the develop-
ment of minerals. 74 At first glance it would appear that once the
debtor-lessor, J.H. Land & Cattle Company, executed the lease and ac-
cepted the bonus money it had no future obligations to satisfy under
the lease contract, and therefore the unexpired oil and gas lease should
not have been held to be executory. In addition, the nondebtor-lessee
arguably had no future obligations to perform under the lease since
with modem oil and gas lease forms75 a covenant to drill an explora-
tory well is not implied by the courts.76  However, neither of these
73. 8 Bankr. at 239.
74. J. LOWE & C. ARNOLD, ANATOMY OF MODERN OIL AND GAS LEASE, DELAY RENTALS
AND LEASE ADMINISTRATION 16 (1983).
75. The duty to drill an exploratory well "is of less importance because of the modem leasing
practices." 5 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 57.1, at 47 (1978) (citation
omitted); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 812, at 63,
67 (1982) provides:
Very little litigation over the covenant to drill an initial exploratory well is now encoun-
tered ... [because] the covenant has been rendered a dead letter by the development of
the oil and gas lease form ... [which contains an "unless" or "or" clause that] elimi-
nates the implied covenant ....
It is uniformly held that a covenant to drill an initial well is not implied in such
leases ... [because] [t]he express rental clause fully covers the subject matter of drilling
an initial well, thus precluding the raising of an implied covenant.
Id See generally 5 E. KUNTZ, supra at 48, 50 (drilling delay rental clause in primary term deals
with implied duty to drill exploratory well, and is designed to supercede implied duty to drill an
exploratory well by payment of drilling delay rentals in lieu of drilling an exploratory well); J.
LOWE & C. ARNOLD, supra note 74, at 15, 17-19 (fundamental goal of oil and gas lease is to
preserve right to develop leased land but without obligation, at least for the primary term; func-
tion of drilling delay rental clause is to negate inference of an implied obligation to test the prem-
ises during the primary term; effect of drilling delay rental clause is to hold lease conditioned on
periodic delay rental payments or conduct of drilling operations).
76. In Oklahoma, a duty to drill an exploratory well exists if the lease does not contain provi-
sions to the contrary. Hitt v. Henderson, 112 Okla. 194, 197, 240 P. 745, 747 (1925). However,
parties can remove implied covenant to drill an exploratory well by lease provision. 5 E. KUNTZ,
supra note 75, at 49;see also Chapman v. Kendall, 145 Okla. 107, 110, 291 P. 97, 99 (1929) (where
lease contains express stipulation for delaying development in primary term by payment of delay
rentals, no implied covenant arises); Southwestern Oil Co. v. Kersey, 80 Okla. 135, 136, 195 P. 120,
120 (1921) (payment of drilling delay rentals is sufficient to postpone development); Eastern Oil
Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 277, 177 P. 104, 105 (1918) (no covenant to develop will be implied in
face of express stipulation for payment of periodic delay rentals).
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views is acceptable. Professor Kuntz, in describing the nature of an
unexpired oil and gas lease, remarks:
[An oil and gas lease] is unique. It is a conveyance of an in-
terest in real property, with conditions and special limitations,
which create a continuing relationship between the parties. It
is also an executory contract in that it contains elaborate con-
tractual provisions which continue in force between the lessor
and the lessee during the life of the interest granted.77
Therefore, in situations similar to the facts presented in In re J.H. Land
& Cattle Co. 8-where the nondebtor-lessee holds the lease by payment
of delay rentals-a "continuing relationship"7 9 exists between the par-
ties which contains "elaborate contractual provisions"8 sufficient to
place continuing future duties upon the lessor and lessee which are
characteristic of an executory contract.8 '
B. Standards for Trustee's Decision to Reject
Bankruptcy statutes have been silent regarding the circumstances
under which a trustee may properly reject an executory contract or
unexpired lease.8" Therefore, existing case law provides the only rele-
vant guidelines for determinations under section 365(a). 3 Differing
standards emerge in considering whether an executory contract or
77. 2 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 18.2, at 4 (1964).
78. 8 Bankr. 237.
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
81. An unexpired "paid up lease" or an unexpired "top lease" would probably still have the
characteristic "future performance" element of an executory contract. A "paid up" lease is one
without a drilling delay rental clause, "which grants the lessee the rights for a full primary term in
return for a single payment. The shorter the primary term and the larger the bonus, the more
likely it is that the paid up form will be used.' J. LowE & C. ARNOLD, supra note 74, at 20. A
"top lease" is a "lease granted on property already subject to an oil and gas lease. . . to become
effective if and when the existing lease expires." J. LOWE, FUNDAMENTALS OF OIL AND GAS LEAS-
ING 774 (1982).
82. Cook, supra note 27, at 689-90; see also IA BANKR. SERV. (L. ED.) § 6.186, at 280 (1981)
(Code is silent regarding when trustee may reject); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.02[l], at
365-13 (15th ed. 1983) (11 U.S.C. § 365 contains most of statutory materials dealing with rejec-
tion); H. MILLER & M. COOK, supra note 35, at 145 (Code leaves to courts task of formulating
standards for rejection); P. MURPHY, supra note 2, § 9.03, at 94 (Code does not prescribe standards
for trustee's decision to reject); Shanker, supra note 2, at 16 (Act gives no statutory guidance on
how to deal with rejection).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.07, at 87 (15th ed.
1983); H. MILLER & M. COOK, supra note 35, at 146 (courts have established different standards
for permitting rejection); P. MURPHY, supra note 2, § 9.03, at 9-4; Cook, supra note 27, at 698 &
n.62 (no good reason why Act standard should not be applied to cases under Code); Shanker,
supra note 2, at 21 (nothing under Code § 365 suggests different result than result reached under
the Act).
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unexpired lease should be rejected.84 The standards applied have all
used some type of "benefit or burden to the estate" analysis,'- under
which a trustee desiring to reject the executory contract or unexpired
lease would be wise to "make a meaningful cost-benefit analysis and, if
necessary, be able to substantiate that analysis in court. 86 However,
the exact standard to be applied by the trustee to reject a contract re-
mains uncertain. It has never been clear from the case law whether the
burdensome standard, the business judgment standard, some type of
equitable standard, or some combination thereof should be used in the
rejection process. Uncertainty also surrounds the question of whether
the trustee or the court should apply the standard.
As previously discussed, the concept of rejection stems from the
historical right of a trustee to abandon property which burdens the
debtor's estate.8 7 The interpretation of what results in a "burden to the
debtor's estate" has been and remains the focal point of the rejection
controversy. At the heart of this controversy is the issue found in In re
JH. Land & Cattle Co., that is, whether the trustee should have the
power to reject an executory contract or unexpired lease that "while
profitable or generally beneficial, could be, if rejected, replaced by a
more attractive arrangement." 8  The court in In re JH. Land & Cattle
Co. utilized the business judgment test in approving the rejection of a
profitable unexpired oil and gas lease. 9 The trustee sought to reject the
original lease in favor of another arrangement which was "preferable,"
in that it would provide the estate with a larger royalty interest result-
ing from the "immediate" drilling of wells. In contrast, the original
leases did not require immediate development. The original lessee held
the leases for approximately thirty days prior to the debtor-lessor's
bankruptcy and had done nothing to develop the premises. Applying
the business judgment test, the court approved the trustee's rejection of
84. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03, at 365-14 (15th ed. 1983) ("There are several
schools of thought concerning standard to be applied in rejecting executory contract.. . . This
issue is one of the extent to which other parties. . . may second-guess the decision on the ground
that the contract is not in fact burdensome"); Cook, supra note 27, at 693 (courts have established
a variety of standards for permitting rejection).
85. Cook, supra note 27, at 698 (the initial question is whether the contract imposes a burden
on the debtor's estate). Professor Countryman states: "Whether in a given case the trustee will
assume or reject depends, presumably, on his comparative appraisal of the value of the remaining
performance by the other party and the cost to the estate of the unperformed obligation of the...
[debtor]." Countryman I, supra note 6, at 461.
86. Cook, supra note 27, at 699 & n.67.
87. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
88. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 365.03, at 365-14 (15th ed. 1983).
89. 8 Bankr. at 239.
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the original leases based upon the "reasonable likelihood of substantial
benefit to the debtor's estate." 90
1. Burdensome Contract Test
The burdensome contract test was first presented in the equity re-
ceivership case of American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York
R.R. 91 where it was held that a trustee's right to reject an executory
contract or unexpired lease could be preserved only if it was onerous
and burdensome in the sense that continued performance would consti-
tute a positive loss to the estate.92 InAmerican Brake Shoe, the debtor-
lessor of an unexpired real property lease, through the trustee, sought
to reject the lease's heat and electricity covenants, even though the
leased property with all its covenants was profitable. 93 In disallowing
the rejection of the unexpired lease, the court stated:
[A] court of equity should not disaffirm .. .a lease . ..
merely because the. . . lessor made what. . .[became] a bad
bargain, although a good enough bargain originally. It is the
duty of the receiver to make every proper effort to increase the
assets of an estate, but not at the expense of fundamental
principles of fair dealing. . . . [A] lease presupposes continu-
ance, even in the face of a receivership of the landlord, so
long as the landlord's receivership estate is not burdened or
put to loss, and by "burdened" is not meant that the lease
could be more profitable, but that it entails a positive loss or
encroachment on the corpus or capital of the estate.
In the case at bar there is no evidence that the lease is a
burden . . . i.e., that . . . the estate suffers an actual loss as
distinguished from the obtaining of a more profitable rental.94
In a recent case, In re Overmeyer,95 a trustee was again seeking rejec-
tion of a contract in favor of a more profitable one. The trustee wanted
to reject leases of warehouse space because the overall profitability of
90. Id
91. 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). See generally Bienenstock, supra note 2, at 33 (discusses
American Brake Shoe); Shanker, supra note 2, at 20-21 (same).
92. 278 F. at 843-44.
93. "The trustee apparently felt the lease was nevertheless burdensome since the estate could
make more money if it was not required to supply electricity and heat." Creedon & Zinman,
supra note 4, at 1397.
94. 278 F. at 843-44; see also Creedon & Zinman, supra note 4, at 1397 (discussingAmerican
Brake Shoe); Silverstein, supra note 2, at 485-86 (same).
95. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
1983]
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the warehouse was being impaired by the unreasonably low yearly
rental.96  The court did not allow rejection of the leases, finding the
dispute involved a desire by a landlord to terminate the lease "purely
because the provisions have, after 8 years, turned out to yield less in-
come than is desired."97 In the opinion of the Overmeyer court, the
burdensome test could be satisfied where performance of the contract
would "[constitute] a drain on the debtor's assets in the sense that...
continued performance would require an outlay of funds for a no
longer needed purpose. "98
In cases where the trustee did not want to disaffirm in order to
adopt a more profitable executory contract or unexpired lease, but
rather desired only to reject the "burdensome" contract, the burden-
some test has been stated in various ways. One court focused on the
equitable nature of rejection and noted that the rejection should be per-
mitted "if disaffrmance . . . is 'advantageous to the debtor' ....
[A]ny disadvantage of keeping the contract in force must be weighed
against the liability that may be created by its rejection." 99 A second
court described the burdensome test as a balancing process, since the
"power [of the bankruptcy court is] to rid the. . . estate of exorbitant
unjustified expenditures and thereby. . . protect. . the creditors."'"
Other courts have emphasized rejection which facilitates
96. Id at 518. The debtor operated a long-term warehouse space leasing business. The
debtor leased the space and then as sublessor, sublet the space to another lessee in excess of what
was paid to the original lessor. The debtor made a ten year lease with its sublessee, West Cash &
Carry, for $.60 per square foot per annum. The trustee argued the fair and reasonable value of the
warehouse space was $1.10 per square foot per annum.
97. Id at 520. The court noted that rejection of an executory contract is generally "based
upon a debtor's desire to terminate a commitment which presents a financial drain on a company
seeking to rehabilitate itself... [without reorganization proceedings]." Id The equity court
would not permit the debtor-lessor to reject an unexpired lease which "with changing circum-
stances, . . . [had] become less attractive." Id at 521.
98. Id at 521 (citations omitted). See also In re Royal Inns of America, Inc., 2 BANKR. CT.
DEC. (CRR) 593 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1973) (if contract is burdensome and onerous, rather than
simply unprofitable, then trustee can reject); accord In re Redi-cut Carpets, Inc., 21 COLLIER
BANKR. CAS. (MB) 401, 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Court using business judgment test deter-
mined rejection was not an exercise of good business judgment; holding was substantiated by the
"proposition that a debtor, having made a good bargain for itself before filing of a petition, does
not have automatic right to reject. . . merely because passage of time. . . rendered the bargain
less attractive.").
99. Van Dyk Research Corp. v. SCM Corp. (In re Van Dyk Research), 13 Bankr. 487, 507
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1981).
100. Chicago Junction R.R. v. Sprague (In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co.), 129 F.2d 1, 4 (7th
Cir. 1942) (court has power to discard "disastrous financial entanglements," id at 5); see also In re
Pennsylvania Fruit Co., 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 537 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1975) (rejection
should be allowed if it is essential to reorganization and would be in best interests of persons
affected by rejection).
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reorganization. 01
2. Business Judgment Test
In comparison, the business judgment test does not obligate the
trustee to assume an executory contract or unexpired lease even where
it is marginally profitable if assumption is not advantageous to,' 0 2 or
otherwise in the best interests of, an estate."0 3 The business judgment
standard was first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court sev-
eral years after American Brake Shoe" in Group of Institutional Inves-
tors v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. AKR. 1o In Institutional Investors, the
Court allowed the reorganization debtor to reject an unexpired lease
which was "a valuable asset of the estate" because "the question [of]
whether a lease should be rejected. . . is one of business judgment."0 7
In light of this Supreme Court decision, most jurisdictions reject the
burdensome test as "questionable authority" and instead favor the
business judgment test.'018 One court stated that its reliance on the
business judgment test was "dictated by logic as much as precedent."'10 9
One authority remarked that:
Whatever the support for. . . [the burdensome test], it does
not seem to be too persuasive. The purpose of the power to
reject is to augment the estate of the debtor. For this purpose,
101. E.g., Bradshaw v. Loveless (In re American Nat'l Trust)
, 
426 F.2d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir.
1970) (if executory contract is detrimental to effective reorganization, rejection should be
authorized).
102. Eg., In re United Cigar Stores Co., 69 F.2d 513 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 566
(1934); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
103. See, e.g., In re 1430 Equities, Inc., 18 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 289, 295-98 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1978).
104. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
105. 318 U.S. 523 (1942). The Court held, "The question whether a lease should be rejected
... is one of business judgment." Id at 550 (citations omitted).
106. Id at 549.
107. Id at 550.
108. See In re Florence Chi-Feng Huang, 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 972, 974 (9th Cir. 1982)
(virtually all recent Code cases follow business judgment test); Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re
O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 104, 118 & n.10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (under Code,
business judgment is prevailing test); In re National Sugar Refining Co., 21 Bankr. 196, 197
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (under Act, majority of courts applied business judgment test); In re Ma-
rina Enter., Inc., 5 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 434, 441 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (no doubt
business judgment test controls). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03, at 365-18
(15th ed. 1983) (business judgment test more likely to be applied than burdensome test); P. MUR-
PHEY, supra note 2, § 9.04, at 9-4 (business judgment test remains good law); Bienenstock, supra
note 2, at 34-35 (discussing business judgment rule). Countryman I, supra note 6, at 461 & n.87
(authorities that advocate burdensome test overlook Supreme Court decision on Institutional In-
vestors); Shanker, supra note 2, at 21-22 (decision of IstitutionalInvestors may have cast doubt on
American Brake Shoe).
109. In re Florence Chi-Feng Huang, 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 972, 974 (9th Cir. 1982).
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there seems to be no difference between an obligation which
consumes cash, and an obligation which, because of its de-
pressive effect on a particular asset or because of its underval-
uation of that asset consumes a part of the value of that asset.
In the end the latter will turn up as a net reduction in cash to
pay the creditors.' 10
A common law court which considered the business judgment standard
found that the business judgment test is "a question of business policy,
upon which the minds of reasonable men might differ."' " The court
concluded that any reasonable basis which supports the rejection of an
unexpired lease will be approved by a court since:
It is a question, not of law, but of business judgment, which
requires for its intelligent answer an extended experience, a
special knowledge, and an intimate acquaintance with every
vein and artery of the entire system. . .[of the debtor's busi-
ness] which no court that ever sat or ever will sit could possi-
bly acquire from affidavits, however voluminous, or from
arguments, however extended."12
Although the Court in Institutional Investors1I 3 did not determine
the "scope of authority" to reject leases, 4 the authority to use the busi-
ness judgment test in rejecting leases was confirmed in In re Minges. 1
InMinges, the court allowed rejection of an unexpired lease in the form
of an executory contract despite the fact that the debtor could have
received a net financial benefit by assuming it." 6  Under the Minges
rationale, the fact that a profit could be made under an unexpired lease
will not prevent rejection' 17 because the standard should be flexible:" 8
110. Krasnowiecki, supra note 37, at 382.
111. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 81 F. 254, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1897) (the
issue presented by the court is a question of business policy, and not a question of law) (cited with
approval in Institutional Investors, 318 U.S. at 550).
112. Park v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 57 F. 799, 802-03 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) (cited with
approvalin Institutional Investors, 318 U.S. at 550).
113. 318 U.S. 523.
114. Id at 549.
115. 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979). See Bienenstock, supra note 3, at 34. Professor Cook notes
that Justices Feinberg (majority) and Mansfield (concurrence) "provide excellent bases from
which to derive flexible criteria for the rejection of executory contracts under the Code." Cook,
supra note 27, at 690.
116. In Minges, the debtor-lessor was obligated to provide utilities and janitorial services to
the lessee. Because, the lessee's rental payment was only half of the market rental value of the
premises and because the covenants to provide utilities and janitorial services consumed a "very
large portion" of rental income, the court permitted rejection of the leases as the "property [was]
clearly capable of producing more income without them." 602 F.2d at 43.
117. The Minges court noted that other courts have utilized the flexible business judgment test
without calling it that by "emphasizing potential greater profit for the debtor's estate in deciding
whether to permit rejection of an executory contract." Id
118. The Minges court noted:
A rigid test, permitting rejection only where the executory contract will cause a net loss
[Vol. 19:68
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"It is enough, if, as a matter of business judgment, rejection. . . may
benefit the estate."' 19 One member of the court contended that: "[T]he
standard governing the trustee should be whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the general creditors will derive any substantial or sig-
nificant benefit."' 20 The Minges court emphasized the factual nature of
determining whether rejection will "enhance a debtor's estate," 12'
thereby yielding a "substantial or significant benefit"' 22 to the general
creditors.'23 Therefore, the court remanded "to make specific findings
after giving the parties an opportunity to present further evidence."'2 4
C. Standard Applied in Reviewing Decision to Reject
The trustee's power to reject an executory contract or unexpired
lease is not absolute.'25 The legislative history of section 365126 sug-
gests that the procedure for court approval of a trustee's rejection will
to the debtor's estate if performed, might work a substantial injustice in cases where it
can be shown that the non-debtor contracting party will reap substantial benefits under
the contract while the debtor's creditors are forced to make substantial compromises of
their claims.
Id; see also In re Mykleburst, 26 Bankr. 582, 586 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1983) (court adopts a
flexible test); In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II, 15 Bankr. 987, 989 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981)
(same); In re Redi-Cut Carpets, Inc., 21 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 401, 404-05 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
119. 602 F.2d at 43 (J. Feinburg, Majority); see also In re National Sugar Refining Co., 21
Bankr. 196, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court allows rejection if estate may be benefitted); Carey
v. Mobil Oil Corp. (In re Tilco), 558 F.2d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); King v. Baer (In re
King Resources Co.), 482 F.2d 552, 557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973) (same).
120. 602 F.2d at 44 (J. Mansfield, concurring).
121. Cf. Allied Technology, Inc. v. Brunemann & Sons, Inc. (In re Allied Technology, Inc.),
25 Bankr. 484,495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (court will approve assumption of lease if it appears to
enhance estate).
122. 602 F.2d at 44; see Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 23 Bankr.
104, 118 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (trustee must only show rejection will benefit estate); In re Silver,
7 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1107, 1110 (E.D. Penn. 1983) (same); Summit Land Co. v. Allen
(In re Summit Land Co.), 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1432, 1436 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)
(same); cf. Cadillac Vending Co. v. Haynes (In re Haynes), 19 Bankr. 849, 852 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1982) (debtor can reject solely on grounds that it is "a reasonable exercise of its business
judgment").
123. Cook, supra note 27, at 701. Professor Cook states that Rule 914 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure "gives the bankruptcy judge the power to make pretrial discovery available
to the parties." Id at n.83; see also H. MILLER & M. COOK, supra note 35, at 149 (need a strong
factual showing that substantial or significant benefit will result from rejection in reorganization
context).
124. 602 F.2d at 44.
125. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 5, 7.10, at 7-38; Cook, supra note 27, at 702-
03 (rejection is not automatic but is a matter in the court's discretion).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
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be dealt with by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 127 or by local court
rules.'2 The rules promulgated for bankruptcy procedure offer little
guidance regarding the standards for court approval. 29  A split of
opinion exists as to precisely who reviews the decision to reject, and
what standard is applied in the review process.
By the terms of section 365(a), the decision to reject an executory
contract or unexpired lease is "subject to court approval."'130 Despite a
majority belief that rejection cannot occur without court approval, dis-
agreement surrounds the standard for court approval.1 3  For example,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Tico ' 32 faced a fact situa-
tion similar to that in In re JH. Land & Cattle Co.; the court was re-
viewing a rejection of income producing executory contracts. 133  The
court remanded the case, holding that the lower court should apply the
business judgment test after an evidentiary hearing to establish the
facts.134 The Tico court held that it was within the power of the lower
court to approve the trustee's decision to reject, "[a]bsent [any] abuse of
discretion."1 35
Other courts, in interpreting the standard for a court's review of a
127. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 24.
128. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 32, at 295, 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEws at 6252.
129. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 24.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). E.g., In re California Steel Co., 24 Bankr. 185, 187 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1982) (trustee's rejection must be presented to court for approval); In re Flying Airways,
Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1256, 1258 (E.D. Penn. 1971) (rejection requires a judicial act); Videon, Inc. v.
Marple Publishing Co. (In re Marple Publishing Co.), 20 Bankr. 933, 935 (Bankr. E.D. Penn.
1982) (rejection of unexpired lease is devoid of validity without court approval); 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 365.01, at 365-11 (15th ed. 1983) (under Bankruptcy Act, trustees rejection re-
quires court approval); id. 365.03, at 365-13 (power of trustee to reject must be made with ap-
proval of court); cf. In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 20 Bankr. 497, 507-08 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(approval of court can be manifested in "variety of ways," including "in court coalesence of repu-
diation by the trustee").
131. Inre Price Chopper Supermarkets, Inc., 19 Bankr. 462, 466 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (deci-
sion to reject should be approved by court but parties disagree on manner and timing of court
supervision); Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS, 2D
(MB) 1431, 1436 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (authorities differ regarding standard of review to be
applied by the courts).
132. Carey v. Mobil Oil Corp. (In re Tilco), 558 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).
133. Id at 1373.
134. Id; see also In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II, 15 Bankr. 987, 989 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
198 1) (court is the party ultimately charged with duty of applying business judgment test to facts
of each case); In re National Sugar Refining Co., 21 Bankr. 196, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (it is
the courts duty to apply the business judgment test after it has been presented with the facts),
135. 558 F.2d 1369, 1373; see, e.g., In re New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp.
51, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (business judgment is discretionary and will not be disturbed unless clear
abuse of discretion); cf. In re Sun Ray Bakery, Inc., 5 Bankr. 670, 672 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980)
(despite courts opinion that a better procedure existed the court deferred to the exercise of the
debtor in possession's business judgment).
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debtor's rejection, have given slightly different interpretations to this
same standard. For example, in In re Allied Technology, Inc. 136 the
court remarked:
Court approval of a debtor in possession's judgment that
[rejection] of a lease is in the best interest of the debtor's busi-
ness should not be withheld on the basis of a second-guessing
of the debtor's judgment, unless the matter is presented in the
context of 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) for determination of the
larger question of the competency of debtor in possession's
business judgment. . . As long as assumption of a lease ap-
pears to enhance a debtor's estate, court approval. . . should
only be withheld if the debtor's judgment is clearly erroneous,
too speculative, or contrary to the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code . 137
Other courts have based the standard of court approval on the theory
that the debtor's business judgment "is entitled to. .. approval, absent
extraordinary circumstances, as a matter of course."1 38 Four reasons
are presented in support of court approval "as a matter of course":
[First,] this rule places responsibility for administering the es-
tate with the trustee, not the court, and therefore furthers the
policy of judicial independence considered vital by the au-
thors of the Code. Second, this rule expedites the administra-
tion of estates, another goal of the [Code] . . . . Third, the
rule encourages rehabilitation by permitting the replacement
of marginal with profitable business arrangements. Fourth,
the rule is supported by pre-Code cases in [the Tenth]
Circuit. 39
136. Allied Technology, Inc. v. Brunemann & Sons, Inc. (In re Allied Technology, Inc.), 25
Bankr. 484 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
137. Id at 495; see, e.g., In re Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Bankr. 784, 787 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1982) (court approved debtor's "exercise of sound business judgment"); In re International
Coins & Currency, Inc., 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 309, 313 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) ("Court is
satisfied. . . that the Debtor did in fact exercise good business judgment" in rejection).
138. See, e.g., In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 20 Bankr. 497, 508 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (debtor is
entitled to court approval, absent extraordinary circumstances, as matter of course); In re Farrar
McWill, Inc., 26 Bankr. 313, 316 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (court should approve rejection as mat-
ter of course); Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D
(MB) 1431, 1437 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
139. Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB)
1431, 1437 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (citations omitted). Bankruptcy Judge Mabey argues that be-
cause rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease can be achieved via two different
procedural methods, "No reason... [exists] for distinguishing between these [two] situations."
Id One of the two procedural roads by which a chapter 11 reorganization debtor can reject is set
forth in II U.S.C. § 365(a), (d)(2) (1982). This section allows rejection to occur at any time before
the confirmation of the plan; or if a party in interest requests, the court may set a time within
which the trustee must accept or reject. The second procedural mode for rejection is provided for
1983]
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Inmn re JH Land& Cattle Co. ,4o Judge Kline concluded that the
trustee's business judgment was not "clearly erroneous"'' 41 and then
concluded that if the court itself was required to apply the business
judgment test, it was satisfied the test had been met.' 42 Based on the
equivocal position taken by the bankruptcy court, it appears the con-
tours of the standard to be applied in overseeing a trustee's decision to
reject remain unclear. 43
D. Equitable Considerations by the Bankruptcy Court
Whatever the standard applied in reviewing the decision to reject,
it is clear that the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease
in a chapter eleven reorganization must be construed in accordance
with the broad purposes of the entire Code. In theory, the Bankruptcy
Code serves three main goals: it provides the debtor a fresh start; maxi-
mizes the value of the debtor's property as an ongoing concern; and
affords fair treatment to creditors, shareholders, and others with rights
and interests in the debtor's property. 144 It is well established that there
is an "overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the ex-
ercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."' 45 A bankruptcy court is both a
court of law and a court of equity.'4 6 The bankruptcy judge must bal-
ance the rights of all parties 47 while carrying out the underlying pur-
in id. § 1123(b)(2), which allows rejection to occur as part of the chapter 11 plan. Judge Mabey
states: "The plan is confirmed with judicial oversight [in that the court must approve the debtor's
plan which contains the proposed rejection] but the. . . rejection. . . is not approved in the sense
contemplated by Section 365(a)." 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D at 1437.
140. 8 Bankr. 237.
141. Id at 239.
142. Id
143. Compare two cases in which the court did not enunciate a standard for reviewing the
trustee's decision to reject. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. (In re
Elliott Leases Cars, Inc.), 20 Bankr. 893, 896 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982); LHD Realty Corp, v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. (In re LHD Realty Corp.), 20 Bankr. 717, 721 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982).
144. Julis, Classfying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J.
223, 223 (1981).
145. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (citations omitted); Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939).
146. E.g., In re El Patio, Ltd., 6 Bankr. 518, 523 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (bankruptcy court is
both a court of law and a court of equity).
147. E.g., In re Loiselle, 1 Bankr. 74, 76 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1979) which provides:
It can be stated safely without citation that [the Bankruptcy Court] is a Court of Equity
which must consider the rights of all parties including the bankrupt, the estate, and both
general and unsecured creditors . . . . This equitable flexibility permits the Court in
each case to examine and weigh the positions of the parties, and to exercise its judicial
discretion. . . to accomplish common sense results ....
In re Sung Hi Lim, 7 Bankr. 316, 318 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1980) (as an equity court, bankruptcy
court must seek equity not only for the debtors, but also for the creditors).
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pose of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 Even if it appears the trustee's
decision to reject will benefit the estate, the bankruptcy court can over-
ride the decision and issue whatever orders will best serve the equities
in each individual case.149 Its equitable powers are "necessarily quite
broad and flexible, so that the Court may fashion the appropriate re-
lief."' 5 ° The court inIn re Roger Williams Building Corp. 151 held that a
bankruptcy court can order the abrogation of leases made by a prior
state court receiver if such an order was equitable for the protection of
the bankruptcy estate and its general creditors. t52
The consequences of rejection will be more closely examined by
the court where the estate would not have lost money by continuing
performance under the executory contract or unexpired lease rejected
in favor of a more beneficial one."5 3 Professor Cook has concluded that
there are no hard rules in determining what constitutes a significant
benefit to the debtor's estate; the trustee must consider the extent to
which the claims and encumbrances on the debtor's property are rele-
vant to whether the relief sought will yield a benefit and the nature and
extent of damages flowing from the rejection.'54 Professor Cook also
notes that the Minges court 55 and its predecessors have confirmed that
the rejection process should be equitable in nature and that "[b]efore
granting any motion seeking contract rejection, the reorganization
court should have all the relevant facts before it.' 56
The Minges court stressed the necessity of a flexible test for deter-
148. See Cook, supra note 27, at 693.
149. One court notes that the bankruptcy court:
In exercising its equitable jurisdiction. . . must consider the circumstances surrounding
any claim emphasizing substance over any technical considerations and form, to see that
injustice or unfairness is not done in the administration of the. . . estate; however, these
equitable powers must be exercised within . . . limit established by the bankruptcy
court, to further its purpose, and is subject to its specific provisions.
In re Supreme Plastics, Inc., 8 Bankr. 730, 731 (Bankr. N.D. IIl. 1980). For example, in In re
Roger Williams Bldg. Corp., the court held that in reorganization proceedings, a bankruptcy court
can abrogate leases by a state receiver if "such orders [are deemed] equitable." 99 F.2d 212, 217
(7th Cir. 1939).
150. Flushing Say. Bank v. Parr (In re Parr), I Bankr. 453, 456 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979); see
Leonard v. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank (In re Middleton), 3 Bankr. 610, 614 (Bankr. E.D. Penn.
1980); see also In re Cannady Supply Co., 6 Bankr. 674, 678 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (court can
issue any order to serve equities of case).
151. 99 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1939).
152. Id at 217. The court stated, "It must be borne in mind that the contract was not entered
into by the debtor but by.. . the state court receiver." Id
153. E.g., Flushing Say. Bank v. Parr (In re Parr), I Bankr. 453, 456 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979).
154. Cook, supra note 27, at 701.
155. Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
156. Cook, supra note 27, at 705; see also H. MILLER & M. COOK, supra note 35, at 149 (em-
phasis on equitable principles leads to sounder results).
1983]
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mining when an executory contract may be rejected in bankruptcy
proceedings:1 57
[T]he court [and the trustee] must exercise their discretion
fairly in the interest of all who have had the misfortune of
dealing with the debtor. A rigid test. . . might work a sub-
stantial injustice in cases where it can be shown that the non-
debtor . . . will reap substantial benefits . . while the
debtor's creditors are forced to make substantial compromises
of their claims.
158
The bankruptcy court must exercise its discretion to preclude re-
jection of a contract or unexpired lease where no benefit would accrue
to the creditors from the rejection.1 59 For the proper exercise of this
discretion, meaningful evidence must be presented to the court illus-
trating how rejection would substantially benefit the estate. For exam-
ple, the court in In re Mykleburst,160 after reviewing the evidence, did
not allow rejection of an unexpired lease because the potential advan-
tage to the debtor in rejecting the lease and the considerable risk of loss
of a new lease did not sufficiently offset damages involved in the rejec-
tion. 61  In In re Penn Central Transportation Co. ,162 the court's denial
of the trustee's attempted rejection of unexpired leases was based on
equitable considerations: the lessees were not creditors of the estate,
there were no burdensome covenants, and the leases were negotiated at
arms length.' 63 "The bankruptcy laws are intended as a shield, not as a
sword. Their purpose is to minimize fiscal chaos. . . not to aggravate
157. Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979).
158. Id; see Cook, supra note 27, at 702 (notes that rejection will invariably have an adverse
affect on third parties. The question the court should consider in balancing the equities is the
extent and nature of the harm produced versus the benefits the estate will receive in rejection.
Id ); see also In re Florence Chi-Feng Huang, 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 972, 974 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[a]ny rejection will inevitably entail the disappointment of legitimate expectations. A basic pol-
icy of the Bankruptcy laws is to spread the burden evenly among both those who may have loaned
the debtor money and those who might have obtained a profit from dealing with him"); Cook,
supra note 27, at 703 n.92 (adverse consequence for third parties that could be caused by the
debtor's rejection would be the bankruptcy of the third party); accord In re Hurricane Elkhorn
Coal Corp. II, 15 Bankr. 987, 989 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (Court should use a flexible test because
flexibility is inherent in "bankruptcy court's exercise of its discretionary and equity powers in
determining what contracts do and do not promote the best interest of an estate.").
159. See In re Florence Chi-Feng Huang, 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 972, 976 (9th Cir. 1982).
160. 26 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1983).
161. Id at 585; f Allied Technology, Inc. v. Bruneman & Sons, Inc. (In re Allied Technol-
ogy, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 484, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (court approved assumption of unexpired
lease to avoid arguably greater liability as good exercise of business judgment).
162. 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Penn. 1978).
163. Id at 1356.
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it.' 16 4
In comparison, the court in In re O.P.M. Leasing Services 65 sanc-
tioned rejection of an unexpired lease when it enabled the estate to re-
lease its equipment at a more reasonable and profitable rate. 66  A
trustee can properly anticipate that an attempted rejection of an execu-
tory contract will be denied on equitable grounds when it is "apparent
that the motion [for rejection] was made in bad faith or as a part of a
larger fraudulent scheme."'' 6
7
IV. PERSONAL PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATION OF OIL AND GAS
LEASES IN OKLAHOMA
The classification of an unexpired oil and gas lease as real or per-
sonal property determines the nondebtor-lessee's rights and interests in
the debtor-lessor's bankruptcy estate. If an oil and gas lease is charac-
terized as real property, the nondebtor-lessee will have the right to re-
main in possession for the remainder of the lease term, even though the
debtor-lessor has filed for bankruptcy and rejected the lease.' 68 If the
nondebtor-lessee does not want to remain in possession for the remain-
der of the lease, he can accept the debtor's rejection, and file a claim
against the estate.' 69 In comparison, if an oil and gas lease is character-
ized as personal property, the nondebtor-lessee will not have the right
to remain in possession.1 71 In such an instance, the nondebtor-lessee's
sole remedy is to file a claim against the debtor's estate.1
7 1
State law determines whether an oil and gas lease is classified as
real or personal property.172 Oklahoma is a nonownership or qualified
ownership state1 73 with respect to oil and gas. In essence, under these
164. Id
165. Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 104, 118 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
166. Id
167. Siedlecki v. Casale (In re S & R Serv. Inc.), 26 Bankr. 865, 868 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
168. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), (h)(1) (1982).
169. Id §§ 365(a), (h), 502(g).
170. Id
171. Id
172. Burner v. United States, 4 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 1259 (1979) ("property interests are
created and defined by state law, [and] [uinless some federal interest requires a different result,
there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding"); S. GLASSMIRE, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES
AND ROYALTIES § 28, at 97 (1938) (estate classification of oil and gas lease as realty or personalty
depends on lex loci or local law); W. THORTON, supra note 31, § 51, at 133 ("[The rights of the
parties must be determined by the law of the state where the leased premises lie, although...
executed in another state where lessor or lessee reside.").
173. The nonownership theory of oil and gas has been expressed as a license to search.
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theories no person owns oil and gas until it is produced. 174 The posses-
sor of title to a mineral interest in Oklahoma holds no title to oil and
gas that may be under the surface, instead, the mineral interest owner
has an "exclusive hunting license" to search, develop and capture any
oil and gas that may exist under the surface.175 In Oklahoma, as in
Kansas, 17 6 an individual can not own a severable possessory estate in
oil and gas "in place."' 77
Under Oklahoma law, the classifications of oil and gas leases are
numerous and inconsistent. 178 Courts are, however, in agreement that
I
Oil and gas, while in the earth, unlike solid minerals, are not the subject of ownership
distinct from the soil, and the grant of the oil and gas, therefore, is a grant, not of the oil
that is in the ground, but of such a part as the grantee may find.. .. The lease...
does not vest. . . title to the oil and gas in said land and is not a grant of any estate
therein, but is simply a grant of a right to prospect for oil and gas, no title vesting until
such substances are reduced to possession. . . an incorporeal hereditament.
Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 776, 110 P. 902, 906 (1910). The court in United States v.
Standolind Crude Oil Purchasing Co., 113 F.2d 194, 198 (10th Cir. 1940) stated: "Because of the
vagrant and fugitive nature of oil and gas, the owner of land has no absolute right or title ....
He has only a qualified interest therein ....
See, e.g., Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 70 (10th Cir. 1957) ("oil and gas
is not subject to strict ownership in its natural state under Oklahoma law"); Meeker v. Ambassa-
dor Oil Co., 303 F.2d 875, 882 (10th Cir. 1962) (nonownership theory of oil and gas); see also 17
Op. Att'y Gen. 2 (1965) (Oklahoma is qualified or nonownership theory state); 1 E. KUNTZ, TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.1, at 78 (1962) (in nonownership state, landowner owns
valuable rights with respect to oil and gas which he may exercise to exclusion of all others); Em-
ery, Real Property Mineral Interests in Oklahoma, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 337, 338 (1971) ("no dissent
among scholars that Oklahoma is either qualified or nonownership state").
174. The Supreme Court depicting the qualified ownership theory stated:
Although in virtue of his proprietorship the owner of the surface may bore wells for the
purpose of extracting natural gas and oil until these substances are actually reduced to
him to possession, he has no title whatever to them as owner. That is, he has the exclu-
sive right on his land to seek to acquire them, but they do not become his property until
the effort has resulted in dominion and control by actual possession.
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 208 (1900).
175. An oil and gas lease does not vest title to the oil and gas beneath the land, but "only the
right to explore for and take from the earth any oil and gas found .. " Hitt v. Henderson, 112
Okla. 194, 197, 240 P. 745, 748 (1925) (rule of capture); S. GLAsSMin., supra note 172, § 37, at 128
(Oklahoma courts state lessee has right to explore for oil and gas).
176. Kansas courts have determined that "[a] conventional oil and gas lease generally does not
create any present vested estate in the nature of title to land which it covers, but merely creates a
license to enter on the land and explore for minerals." Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300,
303, 553 P.2d 885, 889 (1976). However, a license is not tantamount to outright ownership of real
property; see, e.g., Holland v. Shaffer, 162 Kan. 649, 170 P.2d 631 (1947); Skelly Oil Co. v. Savage,
202 Kan. 239, 447 P.2d 395 (1968). The Supreme Court of Kansas has placed one limitation on oil
and gas lease construction. In Ingram v. Ingram, 214 Kan. 415, 521 P.2d 254 (1974) the court held
that "an oil and gas lease is personal property. . . .[and] the rights created by oil and gas leases
... constitute intangible personal property except when that classfication is changedfor a specific
purpose by statute." Id at 416, 521 P.2d at 255 (emphasis in original).
177. "Since oil and gas while in the earth are not subject to ownership distinct from the soil, it
follows that all the land owner can convey is the right to develop and explore the land and take
the oil and gas therefrom". Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 390, 109 P.2d 509, 512 (1941).
178. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 214, 154 (1981) (typically leasehold
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oil and gas is personal property when reduced to possession. 179 Never-
theless, when oil and gas are still in the ground, the interest created by
an oil and gas lease may vary depending upon the purpose for which
the classification is being made, the type of ownership theory used to
describe the interest received,' and the definition applied by a partic-
ular statute. 8'
In situations where courts have had no statutory definition to
guide them, they have unanimously held an oil and gas leasehold inter-
est to represent a vested interest in land'82 or an "estate in land."' 83
Courts have held that an oil and gas lease is not "per se real estate,"'184
and the distinction between real estate and an estate in real property
interest is realty, but in Oklahoma and Kansas, a pattern of inconsistency appears in
classification).
179. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 205 (1900); Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla.
204, 207, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918).
180. 2 E. KUNTZ, supra note 77, § 23.23, at 192.
181. Notwithstanding the fact that Oklahoma adheres to the rule that an oil and gas lease is an
incorporeal hereditament, partaking of the characteristics of personal property, there are certain
statutes under which the courts have construed leasehold interest as real property; see, e.g., Jones
v. Tower Prod. Co., 120 F.2d 779. (10th Cir. 1941) (oil and gas lease is interest in real property for
purpose of tax statute); Nicholson Corp. v. Ferguson, 114 Okla. 116, 243 P. 195 (1925) (oil and gas
lease is estate in realty for statute setting out damages for breach of covenants). See generally I H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 178, § 214.2, at 167-70:
The cases. . . [which] classify an interest in oil and gas as realty rather than personalty
fall within one of the following categories:
1) Statutes phrased in such terms as "interests in real property" or "convey-
ances affecting real property....
2) Federal tax statute.. . designed to have general application throughout
the several states despite the technical differences . . . in classification of oil
and gas interests.
3) Federal statute dealing with Indian lands. ...
4) A rule said normally to be applicable in the particular case for reasons
other than the classification of the oil and gas interest as realty or personalty.
Id (Citations omitted). But see, e.g., Duff v. Keaton, 33 Okla. 92, 124 P. 291 (1912) (oil and gas
lease is not conveyance of real estate under probate statute); First Nat'l Bank of Healdton v.
Dunlap, 122 Okla. 288, 254 P. 729 (1927) (interest of lessee is not real estate within meaning of
Oklahoma judgment lien statute). See generally 2 E. KUNTZ, supra note 77, § 23.23, at 193 (oil
and gas leases are personal property under certain statutes).
182. 2 E. KUNTZ, supra note 77, § 23.23, at 192.
183. See, e.g., Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1979) ("Oil and gas
lease creates an interest or estate in realty"). Contra Smith v. Kerr, 100 Okla. 172, 228 P. 951
(1924) (lease of land for oil and gas purposes is not a grant of any estate in land); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Jones, 176 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1949) ("It may be conceded that when judged by the
laws of the states of Oklahoma and Kansas. . . an oil and gas lease is not realty or an estate
therein." Id at 740).
184. Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1979). The court in De Mik v.
Cargil, 485 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1971) stated:
[Iln the character of property created by an oil and gas lease, there is a recognizable
distinction between real estate and an estate in realproperty. Not every kind of estate
recognized in law as an interest in real property is real estate. Although an oil and gas
lease creates an interest or estate in realty, such interest in not per se real estate.
Id at 232 (emphasis in original).
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has been recognized in the law. 8 5 Because of the classification of an oil
and gas lease as an "estate in land," courts have not been able to clearly
classify this interest as either real or personal property but instead have
classified it as a "personal property right pertaining to real prop-
erty."' t8 6 Oklahoma courts have described an oil and gas leasehold in-
terest as an incorporeal hereditament, as a profit a prendre, and as a
chattel real.'87 An incorporeal hereditament encompasses an intangi-
ble, nonpossessory interest in land, 88 or the grant of a right or privilege
to go on another's land. 89 A profit a prendre "implies a concrete bene-
fit. . and is not strictly incorporeal in character. . . [It is] a French
civil law term defined as '[t]he rights exercised by a person in the soil of
185. Hinds, 591 P.2d at 699.
186. S. GLASSMIRE, supra note 172, § 37, at 126.
187. The legal incidents of land ownership with respect to oil and gas lease rights have been
described by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as follows:
The owners in fee simple of the land. . . [have] no absolute right or title to the oil or gas
which might permeate the strata underlying the surface of their land, as in the case of
coal or other solid minerals fixed in, and forming a part of, the soil itself. . .. But with
respect to such oil and gas, they had certain rights designated by the same courts as a
qualified ownership thereof, but which may be more accurately stated as exclusive right,
subject to legislative control against waste and the like, to erect structures on the surface
of their land, and explore therefor by drilling wells through the underlying strata, and to
take therefrom and reduce to possession, and thus acquire absolute title and personal
property to such as might be found and obtained thereby. This right is the proper sub-
ject of sale, and may by granted or reserved. . . . The right so granted or reserved, and
held separate and apart from the possession of the land itself, is an incorporeal heredita-
ment; or more specifically, as designated in the ancient French, a profit a prendre, analo-
gous to a profit to hunt and fish on the land of another. . . . Considered with respect to
duration, if the grant be to one and his heirs and assigns forever, it is of an interest in fee
.... An interest of less duration may be granted, and that for a term of years has been
denominated by this court a chattel real. . . . Such right is an interest in land.
Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 206-07, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918) (citations omitted); see also Mohoma
Oil Co. v. Ambassador Oil Co., 474 P.2d 950, 960 (Okla. 1970) (oil and gas lease is chattel real,
incorporeal hereditament and profit a prendre); Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308 F.2d 785, 882
(10th Cir. 1962) (Oklahoma oil and gas leasehold interest is "presently vested interest in the land
of another. . . an incorporeal interest, or a profit a prendre.") (citations omitted); Greenshields v.
Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 70 (10th Cir. 1957) (oil and gas lease gives incorporeal
hereditament, a profit a prendre); Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300, 305 (10th
Cir. 1945) (oil and gas lease "a chattel real, an incorporeal hereditament and a profit a prendre");
Francis v. Superior Oil Co., 102 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir. 1939) (oil and gas lease in Oklahoma for
a term of years estate in real estate which is an incorporeal hereditament or profit a prendre);
Ewert v. Robinson, 289 F. 740, 745 (8th Cir. 1923) (lessee receives incorporeal hereditament);
Priddy v. Thompson, 204 F. 955, 956 (8th Cir. 1913) (Oklahoma lease is grant of incorporeal
hereditament); E. BRowN, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS LEASEs § 3.02, at 3-8 n.22 (oil and gas
leasehold interest is incorporeal hereditament).
188. See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2D Corporeal and Incorporeal § 11, at 194 (1942); id Heredita-
ments § 17, at 199 (discusses incorporeal hereditaments).
189. S. GLASSMIRE, supra note 172, § 28, at 96; see also McElroy, Unless vs. Or: An Appraisal,
6 BAYLOR L. REv. 415 (1954) ("Incorporeal hereditaments were not corporeal things. They ex-
isted only in contemplation of law, were said to lie in grant and affiliated with chattel interests.
The distinction [between incorporeal and corporeal interests] is, for example, between land and
the profit arising from land called rent." Id. at 423-24 & n.28) (citations omitted).
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another, with a participation . . . in the profits thereof.'" A chattel
real is less than a freehold interest in real estate, and generally is per-
sonal property, except as modified by statute.' While an oil and gas
leasehold interest is a hybrid estate deriving its legal characteristics
from both real and personal property, "it is actually neither."' 92 Schol-
ars and Oklahoma courts have been consistent, however, in treating oil
and gas interests as a personal property right rather than as a real prop-
erty right. 19
3
The bankruptcy courts have yet to determine whether an
Oklahoma oil and gas lease should be considered real or personal
property under section 365(h) of the Code. 94 It is likely, however, that
the courts will be persuaded by the holding in In re .JH. Land & Cattle
Co., finding a Kansas oil and gas lease to be a personal property right.
Therefore, an Oklahoma nondebtor-lessee will probably not be able to
rely on section 365(h) of the Code to protect his remaining interest in
an unexpired lease when the debtor-lessor files a motion to reject.' 95
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR OKLAHOMA OF IN RE J.
LAND & CATTLE CO.
Under section 365(a) of the Code, 9 6 a trustee can reject an
unexpired oil and gas lease when there is a reasonable likelihood that
the creditors will derive a significant or substantial benefit from the
proposed lease rejection. In jurisdictions where oil and gas leases are
characterized as real property, the nondebtor-lessee can avoid the
trustee's rejection power and remain in possession for the remainder of
the unexpired term. In Oklahoma, however, oil and gas leases are
characterized as personal property and the nondebtor-lessee is there-
fore denied the benefits of section 365(h)(1), which would enable him to
remain in possession of the leasehold interest for the remainder of the
unexpired lease term.197
When it appears that a debtor-lessor is hopelessly insolvent, an
190. S. GLASSMIRE, supra note 172, § 28, at 4, 95-96; McElroy, supra note 189, at 423 & n.28
(profit a prendre is "right to remove part of the substance of land, which is an estate in realty in
the nature of an incorporeal hereditament") (citations omitted).
191. 42 AM. JUR. 2D. Chattels Real § 25, at 206 (1942) (discusses chattel reals).
192. Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300, 305 (10th Cir. 1949) (citation omitted).
193. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 178, § 214, at 167.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1982).
195. Id
196. Id § 365(a).
197. Id § 365(h)(1).
1983]
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss1/3
TULSA LAW JOURX'AL
attorney can protect her nondebtor-lessee client in several ways. First,
the attorney should oppose the debtor-lessor's rejection and insist on an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the trustee can meet the busi-
ness judgment or equity tests. 19  Second, because it may often be un-
certain whether the chapter eleven debtor-lessor will opt to reject the
unexpired lease, the nondebtor-lessee's attorney should move to have
the court set a definite time by which the debtor must reject or assume
the lease, 199 preferably before the confirmation of the plan. Third, the
attorney should advise her nondebtor-lessee client to keep informed re-
garding the financial status of the lessor. Should the nondebtor-lessee
suspect that the lessor is approaching financial jeopardy, certain good
faith acts such as commencement of drilling operations can provide eq-
uitable arguments for the nondebtor-lessee defending the unexpired
lease. Equitable considerations may prevent rejection in certain cir-
cumstances. Judge Kline suggested that had there been production of
oil and gas in the facts of In re JH. Land & Cattle Co. the bankruptcy
court may have disallowed the trustee's rejection, as such a result
would have been inequitable to the nondebtor-lessee.2° At the very
least, the nondebtor-lessee should attempt to "look busy" so that if the
lessor does file bankruptcy the equities will be in the nondebtor-lessee's
favor and he will be in a better position to preserve the "benefit of his
bargain" under the lease.
While it remains unclear what factors the bankruptcy court will
consider in determining whether the business judgment or the equity
test is met, courts have, nevertheless, been influenced by certain equita-
ble factors in making their determination to disallow the rejection of a
lease by a trustee. Courts have emphasized the importance of such fac-
tors as the presence of an eager lessee who would willingly enter into a
lease that is more profitable than the one sought to be rejected; the
length of time the unexpired lease has been in effect; the chronological
nearness of the execution of the lease sought to be rejected and the
filing of the lessor's bankruptcy; and, in general, a lack of bad faith by
198. H. MILLER & M. COOK, supra note 35, at 171.
Counsel for the nondebtor . . . will receive notice of a proposed rejection . . . and
should be prepared. . . to litigate the propriety of the disaffirmance. . . . [R]ejection is
not automatic in a reorganization case, but is a matter within the court's discretion. In a
case where the client has bargained in good faith. . . and the contract will not impair
the . . . proposed reorganization . . . [the nondebtor-lessee's attorney] should insist
upon an evidentiary hearing.
Id
199. Id; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
200. See supra note 50.
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the nondebtor-lessee or a fraudulent attempt to reject by the debtor-
lessor.
VI. CONCLUSION
A nondebtor-lessee client may be properly indignant to discover
that despite his regular timely tenders of delay rental payments and
substantial royalty payments, an Oklahoma bankruptcy court may
properly void his lease, instructing him to "stand in line" to collect his
damages from the debtor's estate after first being reduced to the status
of an unsecured creditor. The client will predictably turn his wrath on
his lawyer, seeking to ameliorate the loss of his bargain by extracting a
"pound of flesh" from the one person totally responsible for his loss.
While the rejection of an unexpired lease is often an unavoidable oc-
currence which an attorney is powerless to prevent, disclosure is the
key. When a client bargains with a quasi-solvent lessor and thus ac-
quires a favorable lease, it would behoove the prudent attorney toad-
vise her client that good fortune may not last. A general caveat to all
clients entering into contracts with parties of questionable solvency, as
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